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ABSTRACT Sub-national island jurisdictions (SNIJs) manifest diverse expressions of govern-
ance within typically asymmetrical relationships with a much larger state. Dubbed ‘federacies’ in
the literature on federalism, these bilateral systems of self- and shared-rule arise almost
exclusively on islands. The jurisdictional powers that island federacies enjoy are principally a
result of bilateral negotiations between island political elites and a (usually benign) metropole.
This bargain is struck against the backdrop of a particular colonial inheritance, a local ‘sub-
nationalist’ culture, and the varying ambitions of local elites to win jurisdictional powers to
advance ‘sub-national’ territorial interests. At other times, however, island autonomies arise as
crafted, deliberate devolutions of central governments eager to exploit islands as ‘managed’ zones
for economic or security-related activity in a globalised economy. In either case sub-national
autonomies often show more success and resilience as non-sovereign island jurisdictions than their
sovereign island-state counterparts.
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Kish Island: Fact or Fiction?
From the palm-lined road nearby, the mountains of Iran’s southern coast are
visible. But any shadow cast by Iran’s repressive regime barely seems to reach
Kish’s gentle sand. On this small island, 18 km off the southern coast of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, it is far easier to find a five-star hotel than a mosque.
That’s because Iran’s dictatorial government is trying to showcase Kish not as a
strict Islamic haven, but as an earthly paradise designed to win over the
international community. (Roston, 2005, p. 21)
Kish Island is one of three ‘industrial free trade zones’ approved by the Majlis (Iran’s
Islamic Consultative Assembly) in August 1993. Kish may be small: just 5 km wide
and 17 km long. Nevertheless, it is administered semi-autonomously by ‘‘an
Authority organized as a company with autonomous legal status, whose capital
shall belong to the government’’ (Law on Administration of Free Trade-Industrial
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Zones, Article 5). Its very smallness and islandness lets Kish get away with such a
departure from fundamentalist theocratic rule.
Many readers can be excused for thinking that the above example is a purely
fictional one. For how could the most puritanical, hard-line and anti-Western of
contemporary states—the Iran of the mullahs and the Ayatollahs, member of ‘the
axis of evil’, widely believed to be developing a nuclear arsenal—tolerate shopping
malls, hyper-markets, theme parks, women in high heels and pool tables on part of
its territory? How could it sanction an island which runs its own (semi-private)
airline and has plans for an 18-hole PGA golf course and a Formula One race track
(Roston, 2005; Watson, 2004)?
Yet Kish Island is very real and its modus vivendi is not hard to understand. Iran,
like other states, is keen to attract international capital: hence the conversion to a
visa-free trade zone and booming business hub. Kish’s insignificant, remote and
peripheral island status provides a tolerable and convenient diversion from the
required austere life of the mainland. Here Iran can profitably experiment with a site
that is small, bounded and liberal with no danger of destabilizing spillovers. Here
Kish serves as an informal market for an international trade in avionics, where Iran’s
air force fleet of ageing US-made F-15s, F-5s and F-4s (bought during the reign of
the Shah), now under a US-embargo, can access desperately needed maintenance
parts and expertise.
Mainland – Island Relations
This ‘Mainland Iran –Kish Island’ dialectic is not unique. There are many similar
examples of ‘mainland – island relations’ in the contemporary world which, from a
surface glance, do not seem to make sense. Yet their logic becomes clearer when seen
in the context of states requiring unique offshore spaces outside the straitjacket of the
increasingly restrictive, ‘level-playing field’ rules of global commerce among
sovereign states. Islands provide bounded space for the emergence of ingenious
new species of asymmetrical economies and governance.
The pattern repeats itself again and again where typically large states make
creative use of their small, far-flung and remote island jurisdictions to facilitate
activities that would be simply anathema on home ground. Take Batam Island,
located close to Singapore, which acts as the exclusive economic zone for Indonesia
(Royle, 1997). Or consider Labuan, an integrated international offshore finance
centre, which serves a broadly similar purpose for neighbouring Malaysia (see
www.lofsa.gov.my/lofsa5/index.htm). The Maldives, with its small population and
convenient archipelagic geography, is another fundamentalist Islamic state that
tolerates a vibrant tourism industry via a scrupulous zoning policy (Baldacchino,
2004a).
Even developed metropolitan powers play the same game, in an even more cynical
fashion. The UK, for example, appeals for curbs on low/no-tax regimes via the
OECD and the G7, while encouraging British investment to benefit from the very
same low/no-tax regimes of the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands, Bermuda and the
Cayman1 Islands, for whose ‘good government’ the same UK remains ultimately
dependent. Although a self-professed unitary state, China treats Hong Kong (since
1997) and Macao (since 1999) as ‘special administrative regions’, where ‘‘the socialist
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system and policies shall not be practised . . . and the previous capitalist system and
way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years’’ (Ministry of Justice, PRC). Kinmen
Island for its part acts as a relatively safe clearinghouse for China –Taiwan relations,
particularly appreciated at times of tension (Hung-Ta, 2004).
The rationale for these metropolitan – island arrangements, however, is scarcely
one-sided. From the perspective of small island territories, there are quite plausible
reasons to aspire to an ‘arms’ length’ relationship with a larger ‘mainland’
benevolent patron. McElroy and Mahoney (2000) explain how the smaller players
in these unequal dyads derive substantial economic advantages from the arrange-
ment. These include: free trade with, and export preference from, the parent country;
social welfare assistance; ready access to external capital through special tax
concessions; availability of external labour markets through migration; aid-financed
infrastructure and communications; higher quality health and educational systems;
natural disaster relief; and provision of costly external defence. Autonomy without
sovereignty may also facilitate tourism development because of easier terms of access
and security.
Most of these special conditions have emerged in the context of a history of a
relatively benign colonial relationship—typically one dominated by strategic rather
than economically exploitative interests. The Economist (2003) has claimed that the
island citizens of Aruba, Bermuda and French Polynesia are among the world’s top
10 richest people: these three territories are non-sovereign island jurisdictions,
benefiting from customized linkages with the much larger states of The Netherlands,
the UK and France, respectively. Various other sub-national island jurisdictions
partake of some form of profitable asymmetrical federalism with(in) a typically
larger state (Stevens, 1977; Baldacchino, 2004b).
Of course, it is important to recognize that the arrangements for many of the
islands cited above vary enormously in nature and character from genuinely
powerful bilateral island –mainland relationships 2. Typically arrangements like those
for Kish Island that have been constructed from above, for profit or strategic
convenience, lack the elements of genuine jurisdictional autonomy and historic
entitlement that arise in many enduring island federacy arrangements. Kish Island
cannot presume, for example, to claim a distinct status akin to the Isle of Man or the
A˚land Islands; these are ‘autonomies’ of a totally different order and character.
Moreover, since there is so little sociological or ideological substance or drive in
these island autonomies from below, there is also nothing like claims to ‘nation’
status by the Faroes, or claims of being a distinct or indigneous people that
undergird largely insular Nunavut.
It is when the conditions of island identity are strong and when there are powerful
constitutional precedents to sustain the claim to self-rule that island autonomies
truly come into their own as partners in a genuine bilateral federal covenant.
Constitutional arrangements here are truly ‘federal’, that is contractual, the products
of free consent between the parties, and not merely autonomies that are devolved
from a central government and can be taken away as quickly as they were initially
granted (Elazar, 1987, pp. 5 – 12). Such vigorous examples of federal ‘self-rule’ and
‘shared-rule’ arrangements between islands and their metropoles are set out below in
all their luxuriant variety. These are surely a continuing testament to the rich
governance systems, with all their anomalies and asymmetry, that remain with the
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European retraction of Empire. Moreover, these delicate arrangements between
European metropoles and their maritime dependencies have in turn been absorbed
and ‘grandfathered’ at the supranational level within the European Union.
In their vast majority, then, these examples from the world’s sub-national (mainly
island) jurisdictions show a remarkable pattern of mutual accommodation and
convenience between large (often metropolitan) states and their offshore islands. It is
usually in the interests of neither party to push these islands into straightforward
sovereignty, as was so often the case in the decades following the Second World War.
Now both prefer a negotiated bilateral partnership that can take its place within the
highly variegated ‘federal’ landscape of governance within the modern world. Of
course, there may also be in the metropolitan state an evident embarrassment over
these remnants of empire and the continuing burden that they may present. This is
well reflected in The Netherlands’ ongoing tug-of-war with its Caribbean island
dependencies (see Oostindie, this issue). So the patterns and motivations on each side
for current non-sovereign constitutional arrangements are complex and do not
always move in the same direction or remain constant from one case to the next.
In any event we have to confront the fact that the contemporary global political
and legal geometry is more complex than it has ever been and obliges a rethink of
older notions of sovereignty and the international state system. Upholding and
distinguishing strict ‘sovereign’ from ‘non-sovereign’ entities in international practice
was never consistently followed in the past and is even less tenable today, as power is
increasingly pooled among and across states, and reconfigured and redistributed
from within national territories. This practical spirit increasingly animates the
arrangements of many offshore islands with their metropolitan partners, where non-
sovereign island jurisdictions will wish to preserve, or even enhance, their
asymmetrical status and autonomous powers, rather than take the risk of joining
the ranks of sovereign states themselves. In short, life in the ‘antechamber’ of the
state system (see Bartmann, this issue) may look a good deal more attractive to these
jurisdictions than the romantic advocates of sovereign self-determination had ever
supposed.
Such a position, of course, looks like a timid and self-defeating posture from the
perspective of those who grew up in the heady days of colonial emancipation
following the Second World War; but it is no longer so. Opting for non-sovereign
jurisdictional status may be a highly rational, strategic choice that can result in
substantial net material and security gains for the jurisdiction. As Oostindie’s paper
in this collection so ably demonstrates, such judgements should not to be lightly or
ideologically dismissed, particularly at a time when security concerns are real and
when sovereignty for most islands has largely not delivered relatively high levels of
economic prosperity. Being a sub-national island jurisdiction (SNIJ) typically
bestows a solid safety net supported by a metropolitan power, while granting enough
discretion to safeguard national identity, local culture and the general exercise of
local power. McElroy and Pearce (in this issue) refer to a ‘‘superior level of
performance’’ by SNIJs. The metropolitan player can meanwhile exercise ‘soft
imperialism’ (which does not typically raise eyebrows among the members of the UN
Committee on Decolonisation), keep a watchful eye for potential geostrategic
military or economic rents, and can lavish its munificence upon its small island
beneficiaries.
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Islands nowadays may therefore be wise to ignore the siren call of sovereignty and
cut their arrangements more pragmatically and creatively. Such pragmatism
manifests itself clearly, for example, in the muddy and treacherous waters of para-
diplomacy (see Kelman et al., this issue). Of course, there are many circumstances
where sovereignty will show itself to be the most logical or compelling course of
action: such would explain the independence of East Timor in 2002, and possibly
that of Kosovo and Montenegro soon (e.g. Bahcheli et al., 2004). And there are
many examples where (often small) island sovereign states have succeeded beyond all
expectations and where the tools of sovereignty have been a vital part of the
explanation for their success. A good case study would be Iceland; but, even here, as
Kristinsson (2000) argues, the continued utility of undiminished sovereignty,
together with non-membership of the European Union, will depend on circum-
stances. Surely this is the point: the appropriate political architecture and
jursidictional status for any island can only be known after careful review of all
its options—current and likely in the forseable future—undertaken in a clearsighted
pragmatic spirit (e.g. Le Rendu, 2004). Certainly for our purposes there appears to
be every reason to expect islands making this kind of review to continue to opt for
contoured, negotiated, non-sovereign, constitutional arrangements in the future (e.g.
Dodds, 2002).
An ‘Island Studies’ Holistic Perspective
We now move to a panoramic vantage point from which to observe and to
understand how small islands—as parts of larger, multi-layered systems—have
adapted and sustained themselves historically and how they now address current
pressures of globalization and environmental threats. Table 1 discloses a ‘panorama’
indeed, with sub-national island autonomies that span all oceanic basins and boast
all manner of diversities of size, climate, topography, ecology, history, economy,
politics, and jurisdiction.
These islands are the rich breeding grounds for unique adaptations of governance
in the modern world, just as surely as islands have, ever since the days of Darwin and
his contemporaries, provided bounded territories for the study of biological and
ecological systems in nature. A case study of an island such as Tasmania (see
Stratford, this issue) can sensitively explore some of these dimensions and properties
of islandness—isolation and distinctiveness—as island ‘resources’. As the work of
comparative federal scholar Ronald Watts has so powerfully illustrated (Watts,
2000; 2003), islands are also an excellent lens through which to understand unique
variations in federal governance arrangements. Watts’ taxonomy of islands borrows
its language and ideas about island federal relationships from evolutionary biology
with its talk of variations or ‘species’ within a genus of self- and shared-rule
arrangements. Table 2 sets out the range of governance possibilities, some of which,
such as federacies, appear uniquely contoured for island territories.
Watts arranges many de jure islands into these constitutional groupings, while
avoiding problematic cases (like the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus). The
evidence also shows two kinds of physical determinism: 1) a high logistical
inclination for islands to enjoy some powers of self-rule, with different kinds of
shared-rule arrangements with metropolitan states; and 2) a tendency for islands to
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Exploring Sub-national Island Jurisdictions 5
be run as single jurisdictions, as if there were something abhorrent about splitting
that which nature had defined as unitary (Baldacchino, 2002).
In fact, while there are millions of islands, only nine (at most) today are split
between two or more different countries (Baldacchino, 2006, p. 854). Small island
territories have been ‘‘decolonizing without disengaging’’ (Houbert, 1986) over the
past 60 years, starting with the ‘departmentalization’ of four French overseas island
territories in 1946, followed by the setting up of the Netherlands Antilles in 1954,
and dramatized by the secession of Anguilla from St Kitts-Nevis in 1979. Historical
practice and/or international provisions have secured over time the autonomy of
such locations as A˚land, Svalbard, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. Military
interventions and/or sectarian strife has led to de facto autonomous jurisdictions in
Northern Cyprus, Mindanao, Sri Lanka and Taiwan (although the latter is
somewhat unique in being recognised by a number of states). Constitutionally or
legally entrenched provisions secure and frame the autonomy of island provinces
like Hawaii, Mwali, Prince Edward Island and Tasmania. ‘First nations’ enjoy
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Table 1. Populated sub-national island, or mainly island, jurisdictions (SNIJs)
1. West Atlantic/Caribbean: Anguilla, Aruba, Netherlands Antilles (Bonaire, Curacao,
Saba, St Eustatius, Sint Maarten), Barbuda, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman
Islands, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Montserrat, Nevis, Puerto Rico, San Andres y
Providencia, Tobago, Turks & Caicos Islands, US Virgin Islands (20)
2. South, Central and North-East Atlantic, all related to Britain: Alderney, Ascension,
Falklands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Northern Ireland, Sark, Scotland, Shetland
Islands, St Helena, Tristan da Cunha, Wales (13)
3. Scandinavia: A˚land, Bornholm, Faeroes, Gotland, Greenland, Hiiumaa, Lofoten,
Saaremaa, Svalbard. (9)
4. South Pacific: Admiralty Islands/Manus, American Samoa, Banaba, Bougainville,
Chatham Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Cook Islands, Easter Island/Rapa Nui, French
Polynesia, Galapagos, Kosrae, Macquarie Island, New Caledonia, Niue, Norfolk Island,
Pitcairn, Pohnpei, Rotuma, Tasmania, Tokelau, Torres Strait Islands, Truk, Wallis and
Futuna, Yap (24)
5. North-West Atlantic: Baffin Island/Nunavut, Cape Breton Island, Iˆles de la Madeleine,
Newfoundland & Labrador, Prince Edward Island, St Pierre et Miquelon (6)
6. Mediterranean and East Atlantic: Territories associated with European Union member/
applicant countries: Azores, Akrotiri & Dhekelia, Balearics, Canaries, Corsica, Gozo,
Madeira, North Cyprus, Sardinia, Sicily (10)
7. Indian Ocean/East Africa: (Andaman & Nicobar, British Indian Ocean Territory, Kish,
Lakshadweep, Mayotte, Njazidja, Mwali, Nzwani, Pemba, Reunion, Rodrigues, Socotra,
Zanzibar). (13)
8. South Asia, East Asia & North Pacific: (Aceh, Aleutians, Guam, Hainan, Hawai’i, Hong
Kong, Irian Jaya, Jeju/Cheju, Labuan, Macao, Mindanao, Northern Marianas, Okinawa,
Queen Charlotte Islands/Haida Gwaii, Sabah, Sarawak, Sakhalin & Kuriles, South
Moluccas, Tamil Eilam, Taiwan). (20)
Total: 115a
Note: This number would increase marginally if ‘enclaves’—which could be considered land-
based ‘islands’, like Gibraltar, Ceuta and Melilla—were included.
Inclusion in this (non-exhaustive and dynamic) list is not to be construed as an act of acknow-
ledging the legitimacy or otherwise of any jurisdictional powers, de jure or de facto.
Date of Compilation: 15 June 2006.
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self-determination in locations such as Nunavut, Haida Gwaii/Queen Charlotte
Islands, Rotuma and the Torres Strait. There are the various former colonies, not
interested in independence (as stubbornly confirmed in various plebiscites), and
engaged in evolving binary relations with Amsterdam, Copenhagen, London, Paris,
Sydney, Washington or Wellington. Specific sub-national arrangements treat Kish,
Labuan, Madeira, Corsica, Sicily, Nevis, Scotland or Zanzibar differently from the
rest of the respective state, often in respect of cultural differences and distinct
histories, or as an outcome of deliberate, central government strategy. There are also
special island (or mainly island) regions which enjoy a specifically different
autonomy portfolio, de jure or de facto: Hong Kong, Macao, Shetland and
Sakhalin – thanks to a recognition of the prudent management of resourcefulness
(investment finance, human capital, fossil fuels) that might be threatened by a loss of
autonomy.
The Commonwealth, it must be noted, has its own constellation of ‘mainland –
island’ relations. Indeed, for a pan-national organization, it has the largest such
assembly of concerned locations. The rationale for such a concern differs, and there
are examples from the complete spectrum of Watts’ taxonomy (see Table 3).
Other Commonwealth members, being archipelagic states, have an interest in
examining the extant division of powers between central and peripheral govern-
ment—these would include Bahamas, Kiribati, Maldives, Seychelles, Solomon
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Samoa. Singapore, while also not on the list,
may have an ultra-nationalist interest in some of its neighbouring Malaysian islands
(Bunnell et al., 2006). Nauru, though a sovereign state, has been added as a case that
beckons creative diplomacy (Connell, 2006).
One observation arising out of Table 2 is that many SNIJs already enjoy a form of
direct representation within the Commonwealth, particularly within the membership
of some of the 85 civil society organizations and through active participation in the
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Table 2. A taxonomy of sub-national island jurisdictions (after Watts, 2000)
. Unions (unitary polities where constituent geographic units maximize ‘shared rule’ at the
expense of sub-national autonomy) as are Tobago (within Trinidad & Tobago) and Gozo
(within Malta).
. Constitutionally decentralized Unions (basically unitary in form but incorporating
constitutionally protected sub-national units of government) such as Anguilla (in relation
to the UK), Guam (in relation to the USA), Niue (in relation to New Zealand), Zanzibar
(in relation to Tanzania).
. Federations (compound polities, combining strong constituent units with a strong central
government) as are Prince Edward Island (a province in Canada); Tasmania ( a state in
Tasmania); Hawaii (a state in the USA).
. Confederations (with several pre-existing polities joining together to form a common
‘government’ for certain limited purposes). The island nations of Cyprus, Ireland, Malta
and the UK operate within a predominantly confederal European Union, although over
time there are more and more binding federal features to the EU
. Federacies (asymmetrical federal relationships, with smaller units linked to a larger polity
but retaining considerable and specific autonomy) as are the Isle of Man, Greenland and
Puerto Rico.
. Associated States (similar to federacies, but can be dissolved by either of the two units
acting on pre-arranged terms) as are the Cook Islands in relation to New Zealand.
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Table 3. The Commonwealth’s constellation of ‘mainland – island’ relations
No
Associated
Commonwealth
power/state
Sub-national island
jurisdiction Description Capacities
Effective
date for
autonomy
1 Antigua & Barbuda Barbuda Special status within Antigua & Barbuda
(local Council, 11 members)
moderate,
fiscal
1981
2 Antigua & Barbuda Redonda Dependency of Antigua & Barbuda limited 1981
3 Australia,
Commonwealth of
Christmas Island Territory (unicameral Shire Council, 9 seats) limited 1958
4 Australia,
Commonwealth of
Cocos (Keeling)
Islands
Territory (unicameral Shire Council, 7 seats) limited 1955
5 Australia,
Commonwealth of
Norfolk Island Territory with Commonwealth responsibilities
administered by Australia
moderate 1979
6 Australia,
Commonwealth of
Tasmania State (province) within Commonwealth extensive 1901
7 British Crown Guernsey, Bailiwick
of
Crown dependencies (not in EU) Alderney,
Guernsey, Herm, Sark, small islets. Has had
Chief Minister since 2005.
extensive 1204?
8 British Crown Jersey, Bailiwick of Crown dependency (not in EU), largest of
Channel Islands. Chief Minister since 2005.
extensive 1204?
9 British Crown Man, Isle of
(Mannin)
Crown dependency (autonomous state not in
EU but has access to EU market). Chief
Minister since 2005.
extensive
10 Canada Newfoundland &
Labrador
Province within Federation moderate 1949
11 Canada Nunavut (islands and
mainland)
Territory (self-governing Inuit homeland) moderate 1999
12 Canada Prince Edward Island Province within Federation moderate 1873
13 Cyprus Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus
De facto state over 37% of Cypriot territory,
internationally recognized only by Turkey
limited 1992
14 Fiji Rotuma administered by district officer; Rotuma
Council
limited 1992
(continued )
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Table 3. (Continued )
No
Associated
Commonwealth
power/state
Sub-national island
jurisdiction Description Capacities
Effective
date for
autonomy
15 India Lakshadweep Union Territory admin by national
government
limited 1956
16 India Andaman & Nicobar Union Territory admin by national
government
limited 1956
17 Malaysia Sabah (North
Borneo)
State (Province) with certain constitutional
prerogatives (e.g. immigration controls)
limited 1963
18 Malaysia Sarawak (North
Kalimantan)
State (Province) with certain constitutional
prerogatives (e.g. immigration controls)
limited 1963
19 Malta, EU Gozo Ministry for Gozo; so far separate electoral
district
limited 1987, 1998
20 Mauritius Rodrigues Regional Assembly extensive 2001
21 Nauru Nauru Sovereign state since 1968; on brink of
collapse? To be ‘incorporated’ into
Australia?
extensive 1968
22 New Zealand Chatham Islands Local Council limited 1995?
23 New Zealand Cook Islands Associated state in free association extensive 1965
24 New Zealand Niue Self-governing in free association with NZ at
request of Niue
extensive 1974
25 New Zealand Tokelau Self-administered territory (3 atolls) extensive 1925
26 Papua New Guinea Bougainville (North
Solomons)
Autonomous Province (4 reps to parliament) in
transition (Peace Treaty, 2001)
extensive 2001
27 Papua New Guinea Manus (Admiralty
Islands)
Province (2 representatives to PNG
parliament)
limited 1975
28 Papua New Guinea New Britain (Western
& Central)
Province (3 representatives to PNG
parliament)
limited 1975
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Table 3. (Continued )
No
Associated
Commonwealth
power/state
Sub-national island
jurisdiction Description Capacities
Effective
date for
autonomy
29 Papua New Guinea New Ireland Province (3 representatives to PNG
parliament)
limited 1975
30 Sri Lanka Tamil Eelam Secessionist movement moderate
31 St Kitts-Nevis Nevis State (province) within Federation
(secession pressure, abated in 2004)
extensive 1983
32 St Vincent and the
Grenadines
The Grenadines Islands within archipelagic state limited
33 Trinidad & Tobago,
Republic of
Tobago Ward of Republic, 15-member House of
Assembly
limited 1962
34 UK (claimed by
Argentina)
Falkland Islands
(Islas Malvinas)
Overseas Territory—separate British
dependency (archipelago)
extensive 1998
amended
35 UK Anguilla Overseas Territory—separate British
dependency
extensive 1980
36 UK Bermuda Parliamentary British Overseas Territory—
internal self-government
extensive 1968
37 UK British Virgin Islands Overseas Territory—internal self-government
(16 inhabited islands, 20 islets)
extensive 1977
38 UK Cayman Islands Overseas Territory—British crown colony,
internal self-government
extensive 1962
39 UK Montserrat Overseas Territory (extensive UK aid
following 1995 volcanic eruption)
extensive 1989
40 UK Pitcairn Islands Overseas Territory (local government
Council 10 seats)
extensive 1904, 1940
41 UK Saint Helena Overseas Territory (includes Ascension,
Tristan da Cunha as ‘dependencies’)
moderate 1989
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Table 3. (Continued )
No
Associated
Commonwealth
power/state
Sub-national island
jurisdiction Description Capacities
Effective
date for
autonomy
42 UK Turks & Caicos
Islands
Overseas Territory (40 islands, 8 inhabited) extensive 1973, 1976
43 UK, EU Wight, Isle of Unitary Authority (County Council) limited 1890
44 United Kingdom, EU Zetland (Shetland
and Orkney Is)
Administrative regions of Scotland within UK none no status
45 United Republic of
Tanzania
Mafia Island Province (Chole, Jibondo, Juani Islands and
coastal mainland)
unknown 1979
46 United Republic of
Tanzania
Zanzibar (Unguja) &
Pemba
Autonomous province (Zanzibar, Pemba and
smaller islands)
moderate 1979
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Commonwealth Games. This already highlights the fluid nature of sovereignty, given
that participation in international events is today not restricted to sovereign states.
Islands in Flux
Of course, relationships among most ‘island –mainland’ dyads is far from smooth or
settled. Asymmetrical federalism is by definition in perpetual negotiation: in 2005
Jeju Island become a ‘special administrative province’ of South Korea, enjoying even
more autonomous powers (Chosun Ilbo, 2005) while the Bermuda Independence
Commission has recently visited London for high-level talks (Sanders, 2005). In 2006
Aland has been threatening to scuttle the renewed attempt to get the European
Constitution endorsed (Rennie, 2006), Tokelau has rejected a move to independence
in free association with New Zealand following a referendum (Scoop Independent
News, 2006) and China and Taiwan continue their—so far verbal and diplomatic—
confrontation. The fluidity of the ‘mainland – island’ arrangement is enhanced
precisely because it is both federal (and thus involving multilevel governance, which
presents competing claims for legitimacy and policy competence) and asymmetrical
(where the striking of idiosyncratic or special deals and outcomes is often preferred).
The relationship is liable to change (e.g. in Canada: see IIGR, 2005); and ‘full
sovereignty’ (whatever that phrase may imply in the 21st century) remains a viable
option and vision, should it be impossible to work out decent terms for a sub-
national solution. We could scarcely find a better example of this critical fluid nature
of governance than that of Bougainville (see Ghai and Regan this issue), with the
recent changing nature of that island’s status towards autonomy either within, or
possibly independent from, Papua New Guinea. The issue of renegotiation in these
cases may be fractious: the terms of the relationship may be the subject of civil strife,
guerrilla movements or other forms of internal warfare and diplomatic tension.
These may take the guise of ‘infra-nationalism’, which is a political and institutional
structure beyond the constitution, a de facto island (or sub-island) state apparatus
existing in a taunting defiance of the main state, with which relations are not
harmonious. This has occurred in recent decades in such diverse places as Aceh,
Bougainville, Corsica, Cyprus, New Caledonia, Mindanao and Sri Lanka (Weiler,
1991).
This state of variability is often represented in an expression of ambivalent, ‘love –
hate’ nationalism. The smaller (island) player is often demonstrably proud of its own
(sub?)-national identity, captured also by explicitly showcased cultural differences (in
language, religion, history, ethnic composition, political ideology, other identity
symbols like flags, anthems, currency, monuments and emblems) from its larger
player. Yet it may refer to a benign, special relationship with the larger player for the
purpose of defending its prized autonomy and self-determination (from the threat of
international piracy, general insecurity or irredentist neighbouring states). If the
relationship lies in discord, then local political movements and the public at large are
likely to see, and play upon, the image of the larger player in a colonial or imperialist
light, unfairly and insensitively pushing its weight around, swamping their legitimate
rights to self-determination. The larger player, in contrast, would tend to react (if at
all) by invoking obligations towards order and regional stability and against
renegade, destabilizing and quirky politics. The situation ‘on the ground’ is usually
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far more complex, with different political parties, social classes and other social
groupings on the island, on the mainland and in between (the influential island
diaspora) championing and expressing their preference for one or more of what
could be a bewildering range of relational solutions (e.g. for the Caribbean, see
Ramos and Rivera, 2001, pp. 1 – 21).
Conclusion
By now it should be obvious how far matters have moved on from 1984 when The
Round Table issued its last (and only) thematic issue on sub-national island
jurisdictions (and small states). At that time, riding a significant wave of reflection
triggered by the US-led invasion of Grenada the year before, the issue then was
security for islands still enamoured with decolonization. In the editorial for that
issue, the raison d’eˆtre for small states and the motley ‘left-overs’ of empire was
reduced half-humourously to: ‘‘casino countries, tax havens, sheep stations, bauxite
plants, air bases, tourist traps, oilwells with surrounds, banana plantations and
nutmeg groves’’ (Lyon, 1984, p. 124). This colourful representation was even then an
unfair and incorrect characterization, and it has become increasingly so. Almost as
an act of vengeance many small sub-national island jurisdictions now show enviable
per capita levels of prosperity, even higher than those for small sovereign island
states (Armstrong et al., 1998; Armstrong and Read, 2002; Bertram, 2004; Easterly
and Kraay, 2000; Poirine, 1998).
To be sure, islands can still be used and valued principally for strategic
metropolitan purposes. Japan, for example, maintains its only large and contentious
US military base on the outlying island prefecture of Okinawa, recently the subject
of a resiting agreement (Kakazu, 2000). Britain summarily deported the entire island
population of the Chagos Archipelago and leased the islands to the USA, which in
turn built the ultra-sophisticated Indian Ocean military base at Diego Garcia
(Winchester, 2004). Of course, the USA meets another strategic purpose in the
questionable practice of detaining suspected terrorists in ‘legal limbo’ on its island
base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba (Supreme Court of the United States, 2004). The
Australian government ‘excised’ Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands and the
Ashmore Reef from the nation’s territory for the purposes of immigration, deeming
that persons who had arrived there had not effectively entered the country (Connell,
2006, p. 55).
But this unflattering portrait of sub-national islands as weak and subordinate
containers purely at the mercy of outside metropolitan powers is scarcely the norm in
this new age of globalization and multilevel governance. Island jurisdictions
customarily defy that caricature, whether as fully fledged states or increasingly as
subnational actors working out their own pragmatic responses to the challenges of a
changing global system in concert with their partners. The patterns vary enormously,
as do the constitutional choices and options. Sovereignty is still a powerful dream for
many peoples, whether living on islands or not, and in many circumstances it may be
the best of all options. But we also now live in a world where there is less certainty
about the merits of sovereignty than was once the case, and less arrogance about the
ultimate choices that island jurisdictions ought to take. We welcome this more
pragmatic and tolerant spirit respecting constitutional arrangements, along with the
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confidence and flexibility it engenders among island peoples world-wide. Now
islands can get on with making their choices, and crafting their futures with less fear
and ridicule than in the past.
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